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Eliot T. Tracz 
Doctrinal Evolution and the Right Against Self-
Incrimination 
18 U.N.H. L. Rev. 109 (2019) 
A B S T R A C T .   The Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination is one of the most well-
known constitutional protections as it is often referenced in movies, television shows, and in the 
news.  Despite this wide-spread awareness of the right against self-incrimination, the Federal 
Circuit Courts remain split over whether the right attaches before or during trial.  The specific 
point of contention is when a “criminal case” commences. 
This article examines the history of the right against self-incrimination beginning with its 
common-law origins in Great Britain.  The evolution of the right against self-incrimination is 
explored up to the present-day circuit split, and the cases involved in the split are discussed in 
detail.  Finally, this article argues for a broad application of the right against self-incrimination. 
A U T H O R .   Eliot T. Tracz, J.D. is a Judicial Clerk to the Honorable Kathy Wallace, Minnesota 3rd 
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I NT R ODUC T I ON 
The Fifth Amendment is one of the most well-known constitutional 
amendments.  It is so well known that the phrase “plead the Fifth” has entered 
common usage and can be heard regularly in conversation.  This phrase is a direct 
reference to the protection against self-incrimination, which reads: “[n]o person 
shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”1  While 
this clause is commonly referenced, and the text seemingly unambiguous, the legal 
meaning of the clause is currently in a state of flux. 
Over time, established laws change in meaning and application, even though 
the text of the law itself may stay the same.  These changes are inevitable as law, like 
life, must evolve to fit the world in which it exists.  The right against self-
incrimination is quietly undergoing such a change as multiple Circuit Courts have 
expanded the scope of the right beyond its traditional existence as a “trial right.”2  
At the same time, other Circuit Courts have held tightly to the old application, 
 
1  U.S. Const. amend. V. 
2  See Vogt v. City of Hays, 844 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 2017); Best v. City of Portland, 554 F.3d 698 
(7th Cir. 2009); Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2009); Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 
161 (2d Cir. 2007); Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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resulting in a circuit split.3 
This article addresses the evolution of the right against self-incrimination from 
its common law origins in England to the current federal circuit split.  In Section I 
this evolution is explored in some detail, drawing particularly upon competing 
theories of the origin of the right against self-incrimination.  Section I also briefly 
summarizes relevant Supreme Court precedent.  Section II discusses the theory of 
doctrinal evolution and the ideas of two of its most important theorists.  Finally, 
Section III examines the circuit split and the cases taking each opposing view.  
Section III concludes with an analysis of why it is best for the right against self-
incrimination to continue to evolve and apply more broadly to a criminal case. 
I .  T HE  R I GHT  A GA I NS T  S E L F - I NC R I MI NAT I ON 
A. The Fifth Amendment 
The right against self-incrimination is well known in society, as the phrase 
“plead the Fifth” is commonly used.  Less well known, perhaps, is the actual text of 
the self-incrimination clause: “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself . . . .”4  This clause has been described as a 
“landmark event in the history of Anglo-American criminal procedure.”5  
Some points about the right against self-incrimination are clear.  First, the 
privilege against self-incrimination, guaranteed by the Constitution, applies to all 
individuals.6  Second, “a confession obtained by compulsion must be excluded 
whatever may have been the character of the compulsion, and whether the 
compulsion was applied in a judicial proceeding or otherwise.”7  One unsettled issue 
is what the words “criminal case” include and when a “criminal case” begins.8  That 
is the topic of the rest of this article. 
B. History 
Professor John Langbein discussed two schools of thought regarding the 
 
3  See Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2005); Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d 508 (4th Cir. 
2005); Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550 (3rd Cir. 2003). 
4  U.S. Const. amend. V. 
5  John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at Common 
Law, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1047, 1047 (1994). 
6  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 472 (1966). 
7  Id. at 462. 
8  See infra Section III. 
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origins of the right against self-incrimination.9  According to Langbein, some 
scholars believe that this right arose in the aftermath of the abolition of the courts 
of the Star Chamber and High Commission.10  Langbein himself, on the other hand, 
argues that the right against self-incrimination arose from the evolution of the 
adversarial criminal procedure during the eighteenth century.11  “Thus, Langbein 
credits the work of defense counsel with creating the right.”12  
The first of these explanations follows a post hoc, ergo propter hoc sort of 
reasoning.13  Professor Richard Hemholz has argued that the maxim nemo tenetur 
prodere seipsum, loosely translated as “no one is obliged to accuse himself,” was an 
established principle in English ecclesiastical courts before the earliest complaints 
against the Star Chamber or the Court of High Commission.14  During the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, this maxim was seized upon by Puritans 
in their resistance to demands of conformity to Anglican beliefs.15  As a means of 
enforcing Anglican beliefs, English rulers made use of the ecclesiastical courts and 
the prerogative courts of High Commission and Star Chamber.16  One of the tools 
exercised by these courts was the “ex officio” oath which required the defendant to 
swear to answer any questions put to him on pain of contempt or other sanctions.17 
In 1641, political and military struggles forced Charles I to summon Parliament, 
who used its authority to abolish the Courts of Star Chamber and High 
Commission, as well as to ban the ex officio oath.18  Eminent scholar John Wigmore 
wrote that following the fall of Star Chamber and High Commission and the demise 
of the ex officio oath, “a decided effect is produced, and is immediately 
communicated, naturally enough, to the common law courts.”19 
 
9  Langbein, supra note 5. 
10  Id. at 1047. 
11  Id. 
12  Id. 
13  Post hoc, ergo propter hoc, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/post%20hoc,%20ergo%20propter%20hoc [https://perma.cc/7VPV-X8WM] (last visited Aug. 18, 
2019, 11:43 AM) (meaning “after this, therefore because of this”).  
14  Richard H. Hemholz, Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The Role of the European 
Ius Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 969–89 (1990). 
15  Langbein, supra note 5, at 1073. 
16  Id. 
17  Id. 
18  Habeas Corpus Act of 1640, 16 Car. 1 c. 10 (Eng.). 
19  8 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law 289 (John T. McNaughton ed., 
6th ed. 1961).  
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The second explanation for the origin of the right against self-incrimination, 
and the argument favored by Langbein, posits that the right stems from the 
increased role of defense counsel in the late seventeenth century.20  During the 
sixteenth century, the court was meant to serve as counsel for the accused; Sir 
Edward Coke discussed this idea writing: “[T]he Court ought to be . . . of counsel for 
the prisoner, to see that nothing be urged against him contrary to law and 
right . . . .”21  The court would not, however, aid the defendant in matters of fact.22 
This system necessarily compelled defendants to speak on their own behalf if 
they wished to mount a defense.23  The assumption at the time was “if the case 
against him was false the prisoner ought to say so and suggest why, and that if he 
did not speak that could only be because he was unable to deny the truth of the 
evidence.”24  As often happens, though, things began to change over time.  Defense 
counsel entered the normal criminal trial in the 1730s largely through judicial 
discretion.25  This may be, as Langbein argues, due to a shift in the criminal trial 
towards being a means to test the prosecution’s case against the defendant.26 
Langbein argues that there are several reasons for this shift.  First, the concept 
of “cases” replaced the “altercation” method in which the defendant rebutted each 
piece of evidence as received.27  Second, the presumption of innocence was 
introduced.28  Third, rules of evidence were formulated.29  Fourth, the effectiveness 
of defense counsel increased the use of prosecuting counsel.30  Fifth, the role of the 
judge changed as counsel took over for the defense and the prosecution.31  Finally, 
the relationship between the court and the jury changed.32 
 
20  Langbein, supra note 5, at 1066–67. 
21  Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England: 
Concerning High Treason, and Other Pleas of the Crown, and Criminal Clauses 29 
(1644). 
22  Langbein, supra note 5, at 1051. 
23  Id. at 1049–66. 
24  J.M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England 1660–1800, 348–49 (1986). 
25  John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 311–13 (1978). 
26  Langbein, supra note 5, at 1068–71. 
27  Id. at 1069–70. 
28  Id. at 1070. 
29  Id. 
30  Id. 
31  Id. at 1070–71. 
32  Id. at 1071. 
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Interesting as these two origin theories are, the truth is that we may never know 
how the right against self-incrimination arose.  Practically speaking however, the 
historical origins of the right against self-incrimination become relevant as recent 
Supreme Court appointees move the court farther towards embracing 
Originalism.33  With a split between circuits increasing the likelihood of Supreme 
Court review, the historical origins of the right against self-incrimination may 
become a factor in the outcome.  
C. The Supreme Court 
When does a “criminal case” commence as it relates to the right against self-
incrimination?  The answer is unclear.  The United States Supreme Court case law 
is largely unsettled.  In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court said “[t]he 
privilege against self-incrimination is a fundamental trial right of criminal 
defendants.”34  Although conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may 
ultimately impair that right, a constitutional violation occurs only at trial.35 
The most recent case to consider the right against self-incrimination, Chavez v. 
Martinez, acknowledged that “[s]tatements compelled by police interrogations 
cannot be used against a defendant at trial.”36  The Chavez Court declined to rule on 
when a criminal case begins.37  At the same time, the Court stated that a “criminal 
case” requires, at the very least, the initiation of legal proceedings.38  The plaintiff in 
Chavez was never charged with a crime; therefore, his statements were never used 
against him in any criminal proceedings.39 
Verdugo-Urquidez seems to be clearly of the opinion that the right against self-
incrimination only applies at trial.  Chavez, on the other hand, seems to read the 
right as applying to “criminal cases” though not necessarily limiting its application 
strictly to trial.  Finally, there is Miranda, which requires that a person be informed 
of his or her right to remain silent (that is, his or her right against self-
 
33  Steven B. Katz, The Supreme Court Embraces Statutory Originalism, American Bar Association 
(May 29, 2019) https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/employment-labor-
relations/articles/2019/spring2019-supreme-court-embraces-statutory-originalism/ 
[https://perma.cc/WL66-9ZF9] (last visited Sept. 24, 2019). 
34  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990). 
35  Id.; See also Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 (1993) (Fifth Amendment described as a 
“trial right.”). 
36  Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003). 
37  Id. 
38  Id. at 766. 
39  Id. at 765. 
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incrimination) at the time of arrest, which may be well before trial.40  
The various Circuit Courts are equally inconsistent in their holdings, vacillating 
between the right only applying at trial, and the right being applicable to pre-trial 
proceedings.41  As recently as 2017, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals wrestled with 
this issue but merely added to the already existing circuit split.42  Because of the 
number of circuits that have weighed in on the issue of when a “criminal case” 
begins, the issue is certainly ripe for Supreme Court review.  For purposes of this 
article, each decision reached by the different circuits merits discussion.  
I I .  DOCT RI NAL  E VOL UT I ON 
Evolution is a word that is often used in everyday speech to convey the idea of 
change or, more precisely, of nonrandom change.43  It is often described in a 
Darwinian model, yet ideas of the law as a living thing predate Darwin by hundreds 
of years.44  The British jurist Sir Edward Coke touched on the issue in his famous 
Institutes, writing, “[n]ow as of the old fields must come the new corne, so our old 
books do excellently expound, and expresse this matter as the Law is holden at this 
day.”45 
A. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
Any discussion of doctrinal evolution should probably begin with Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr. and the ideas first presented in his monumental work, The 
Common Law.46  The Common Law began as a series of lectures delivered in 1880 at the 
Lowell Institute in Boston, Massachusetts.  In these lectures, Holmes introduced 
and explored the idea that old doctrines do not die out; they simply evolve to fit new 
policy doctrines.47  Throughout his career, he elaborated on this idea and developed 
it into a more refined theory: 
Every one instinctively recognizes that in these days the justification of a law for us 
 
40  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966). 
41  See infra Section III. 
42  See infra Section III. 
43  Owen D. Jones & Timothy H Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 405, 
479 (2005). 
44  See id. 
45  2 Sir Edward Coke, The Selected Writings of Sir Edward Coke 801 (Steve Sheppard 
ed., 2005). 
46  Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law (Paula J.S. Pereira et al. eds., 1880). 
47  See generally id.   
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cannot be found in the fact that our fathers have followed it.  It must be found in some 
help which the law brings toward reaching a social end which the governing power of 
the community has made up its mind that it wants.  And when a lawyer sees a rule of 
law in force he is very apt to invent, if he does not find, some ground of policy for its 
base.  But in fact some rules are mere survivals.48 
Such theories, however, do not simply spring anew, and Holmes drew influence 
from several contemporary movements of equal stature. 
It is unsurprising that The Common Law is sprinkled with allusions to the 
theories of evolution that were in vogue at the time the lectures were written.  
Charles Darwin published his Origin of Species in 1859,49 and though there is no 
evidence that Holmes ever read it, the influence of Darwin’s ideas were alive and 
thriving in the learned communities.50  
Another equally powerful influence on Holmes was his relationship with the 
founders of pragmatist philosophy: Charles Sanders Pierce and William James.51  
The three were members of a group called the Metaphysical Club whose members 
worked “to come to terms with the new science, which had put all in doubt.”52  
Rejecting a purely logical view of the law, Holmes’ pragmatic influences are clearly 
demonstrated in what may be The Common Law’s most famous passage:  
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.  The felt necessities of the 
time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or 
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a 
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should 
be governed.53  
Given such influences, it is not surprising that Holmes developed a theory that legal 
doctrines, and therefore the law itself, are subject to evolution. 
The most well-known illustration of Holmes’s theory traces the origin of owner 
liability in tort law back as far as the Book of Exodus.54  Holmes cites an oft-quoted 
passage from Mosaic law: “[i]f an Ox gore a man or a woman, that they die: than the 
ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox 
 
48  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 443, 452 (1899). 
49  Charles Darwin, On The Origin of Species By Means of Natural Selection, or the 
Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (Down, Bromley, Kent eds., 1859). 
50  Jan Vetter, The Evolution of Holmes, Holmes and Evolution, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 343, 364 (1984). 
51  Id. at 362. 
52  Id. 
53  Holmes, The Common Law, supra note 46, at 5. 
54  Id.  
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shall be quit.”55  Similarly, Holmes finds equivalents in the Roman laws of the noxæ 
deditio56 as well as the laws of the Salic Franks in Germany.57  Roman and Salic 
influences, Holmes found, could be identified in the laws of the United Kingdom as 
far back as 680 AD, thus providing a direct link between the ancient laws and the 
modern laws.58  By this time, the owner of a violent animal, employer of a reckless 
employee, or other such person held responsible for the injury caused on his watch, 
could simply pay a fee to relieve the liability.59  One hundred-thirty years after 
Holmes delivered The Common Law lectures, it is easy to identify in the early English 
laws the predecessor to the doctrine of respondeat superior.  
Holmes’ dedication to his theory that doctrines evolve even after the basis for 
their origins have disappeared did not end with The Common Law.  In his later works, 
he revisited and refined his theory.60  Applying his theory, he demonstrated how a 
mysterious figure from Salic Law known as the Salmannus, who figured 
prominently in rituals surrounding transfers of real property, grew to be what we 
now know as the executor of an estate.61  Equally as interesting to Holmes was how 
the ancient political practice of demanding hostages as surety for the behavior of a 
defeated foe served as a forerunner for the modern secured transaction.62  For each 
of these examples it was evident that “just as the clavicle in the cat only tells of the 
existence of some earlier creature to which a collar bone was useful, precedents 
survive in the law long after the use they once served is at an end and the reason for 
them has been forgotten.”63  It seemed to Holmes that in the law, as in nature, 
evolution was at work. 
Each of the examples Holmes gave shows a case in which a precedent 
successfully evolved from its original purpose to meet some new need.  From these 
examples, it would be easy to assume that old doctrines that continue to be applied 
are selected for their soundness in their new application.  Holmes warns against 
such an assumption, however, counselling that “if old implements could not be 
 
55  Id. at 10.  
56  Id. at 11. 
57  Id. at 19. 
58  Id. at 20. 
59  Id. at 17. 
60  See, e.g., Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, supra note 48, at 452; Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 457 (1897). 
61  Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, supra note 48, at 444–46. 
62  Id. at 448. 
63  Holmes, The Common Law, supra note 46, at 35. 
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adjusted to new uses, human progress would be slow.  But scrutiny and revision are 
justified.”64  For Holmes, history and experience were acceptable sources for 
modern doctrines, with the strongest precedents surviving to meet new challenges 
as their old uses died out.  It was, however, the duty of lawyers and judges to 
continue to examine the precedents to ensure that they remained valid.  “History 
sets us free,” Holmes wrote in 1899, “and enables us to make up our minds 
dispassionately whether the survival which we are enforcing answers any new 
purpose when it has ceased to answer the old.”65 
B. Robert C. Clark 
Following Holmes’s work, references to “evolution” were uncommon between 
the mid 1920s and the late 1970s.66  Then, in 1977, Harvard Law Professor Robert C. 
Clark stepped beyond Holmes’ application of evolutionary theory to the common 
law and applied it to statutory law.67  Professor Clark was a major proponent of a 
type of scholarship that he referred to as the Interdisciplinary Study of Legal 
Evolution (ISLE).68  
Professor Clark’s first examination of the evolution of statutes came in his 1977 
examination of subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code.69  Professor Clark 
identified a number of fundamental structural decisions that make up the 
foundation of the framework in which taxpayers, the IRS, and the courts interact.  
He theorized that within that framework, lawyers and taxpayers were constantly 
attempting to discover new ways of reducing their taxes.70  Professor E. Donald 
Elliott, a Yale Law Professor and law evolution scholar, noted that while Professor 
Clark described a valid model of change, and despite his use of evolutionary 
language, it is unclear at this point of Clark’s career in what sense he means that 
these changes are evolutionary.71 
In a 1981 paper, Professor Clark developed his most coherent theory of statutory 
 
64  Id. at 37. 
65  Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, supra note 48, at 452. 
66  E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 38, 59 (1985). 
67  See Robert Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform, 
87 Yale L.J. 90, 90 (1977). 
68  Robert C. Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 Yale L.J. 1238, 1238 (1981). 
69  Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C, supra note 67, at 90. 
70  Id. at 95. 
71  Elliott, supra note 66, at 60. 
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evolution.72  He identified two general patterns of change that explained the 
development of laws.73  First, Professor Clark described a four part pattern of 
development.74  In the first part, external changes—whether technological, social, 
or otherwise—create new opportunities for legal rules to reduce certain costs.75  The 
second part featured a responsive legal invention, in which a new legal principle or 
institution is created which reduces costs better than previously identified 
alternatives.76  In the third part, the success of the new legal principle creates new 
needs and opportunities for reducing costs.77  Finally, in the fourth part, substantial 
legal activity occurs, which results in the creation of statutes, regulations, and case 
law aimed at exploiting those opportunities.78 
The cost reduction that Professor Clark identified as a goal of legal change falls 
into two different classes: primary and secondary.79  While primary cost reduction 
is the result of elementary principles of institutional design, secondary cost 
reduction is only achieved by “lengthy, complex efflorescence of doctrinal detail.” 80  
In Clark’s estimation, the associated legal developments are more capable of being 
studied without appealing to changes in exogenous factors.81 
The second pattern identified by Professor Clark involves “the connection 
between changes in the size of economic units or transactions and the subsequent 
development of new institutions and rules.”82  This pattern of development is, in 
Professor Clark’s opinion, particularly applicable to corporate and securities law.83  
Professor Clark attributes the rise of the corporate organizational form to its 
competitive success over alternative forms of organization.84  Professor Clark’s 
theories tend to show those patterns of cost reduction are the underlying force 
 
72  See Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, supra note 68, at 1238. 
73  Id. at 1241. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. 
76  Id. 
77  Id. 
78  Id. 
79  Id. 
80  Id. at 1241–42.  
81  Id. at 1242. 
82  Id. 
83  Id. at 1242–47. 
84  Id. at 1243 (noting the corporate form of organization includes such characteristics as limited 
liability, free transferability of shares, strong legal personality, and centralized management).   
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driving the evolution of legal rules,85 therefore supporting the economic argument 
for why constitutions change over time. 
I I I .  C I R C UI T  S P L I T  
Recent case law supports the existence of an evolving application of the right 
against self-incrimination.  On the one hand, a small group of appellate courts 
interpret Chavez as limiting the right strictly to trial and not to pre-trial 
proceedings.  A number of other appellate courts have found that the right against 
self-incrimination extends beyond trial and encompasses pre-trial proceedings. 
A. Limited to Trial 
1. Third Circuit 
In the case of Renda v. King, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed 
whether a person’s Miranda rights have been violated if that person’s statements are 
not used against her at trial.86  Valerie Renda was involved in a domestic dispute 
with her boyfriend, Joe Sonafelt, a Pennsylvania State Trooper.87  On May 15, 1995, 
Ms. Renda left Sonafelt, taking their two-year old son with her to a friend’s 
apartment.88  Sonafelt reported this to the local police, claiming that Renda violated 
a custody order by abducting their son.89  Local authorities referred the case to the 
Pennsylvania State Police.90  There, Corporal Kelsey of the State Police determined 
that Sonafelt’s complaint, in addition to a complaint that Sonafelt kicked Renda in 
the back the previous day, would be handled by State Police Trooper Paul King.91 
On May 15, 1995, Trooper King contacted Renda by phone.92  During the call, 
Renda told Trooper King that Sonafelt slammed her into a wall earlier that day; 
however, she also indicated that she did not want to file charges or give a 
statement.93  Based on these allegations, Trooper King conducted a tape recorded 
 
85  Elliott, supra note 66, at 62. 
86  See Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550 (3rd Cir. 2003). 
87  Id. at 550. 
88  Id. at 552. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. 
91  Id. 
92  Id.  
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interview of Trooper Sonafelt, whom he provided with a Miranda warning.94  The 
next morning, at about 2:30 a.m., Corporal Kelsey and Trooper King interviewed 
Renda in person, at her friend’s apartment.95  She was not given a Miranda warning; 
however, she provided a written statement that did not mention the May 15 
assault.96  
At trial, Trooper King and Corporal Kelsey testified that when they asked Renda 
why she had not included the assault in her statement, Renda stated that she had 
lied about the assault during her phone interview with Trooper King.97  However, 
Renda contradicted this in her own trial testimony, by stating that she never told 
Trooper King and Corporal Kelsey that she lied, and that the reason she had not 
included the statement about the assault was because she did not want to file a 
complaint against Sonafelt.98  She also testified that she only made the statement 
after Trooper King and Corporal Kelsey threatened her.99 
On June 7, 1995, Trooper King charged Renda with giving false reports to law 
enforcement and obtained an arrest warrant for Renda.100  The statements she 
made to law enforcement were suppressed because she had not received a Miranda 
warning and the case was nolle prossed by the District Attorney’s office.101  
Subsequently, Renda filed suit in the Western District of Pennsylvania, alleging that 
Trooper King and Corporal Kelsey violated her First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights by subjecting her to a coercive interrogation.102  Renda also 
claimed that she was interrogated without Miranda warnings, subject to unlawful 
search, arrest, and imprisonment, and maliciously prosecuted.103  The District 
Court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the First Amendment, 
false arrest, false imprisonment, and Miranda claims, but a jury found in favor of 
Renda on the malicious prosecution claim.104  Renda moved for relief from 
 
94  Id. 
95  Id. 
96  Id. 
97  Id. 
98  Id. 
99  Id. at 552–53. 
100  Id. at 553. 
101  Id.  
102  Id. 
103  Id. 
104  Id. 
T H E  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  N E W  H A M P S H I R E  L A W  R E V I E W  1 8 : 1  ( 2 0 1 9 )  
122 
judgment relating to the Miranda claim but her motion was denied.105  Trooper King 
appealed the verdict and Renda filed a cross-appeal.106 
In determining that Renda’s right against self-incrimination had not been 
violated, the Third Circuit relied heavily on its prior ruling in Giuffre v. Bissell107 as 
well as on Chavez.108  Giuffre, holding that a plaintiff may not base a §1983 claim on 
the fact that police failed to provide a Miranda warning, served as the basis on which 
the District Court granted summary judgment for Renda’s Miranda claim.109  Chavez, 
the court argued, affirmed that Giuffre was good law.110 
Going further, the court found that Chavez was similar to Renda’s case in that 
both cases involved a situation where police questioned a suspect without providing 
a Miranda warning.111  The difference between the two cases was that in Chavez, the 
defendant was never charged with a crime so his statements were never used in a 
criminal proceeding.112  Because Chavez did not address the moment that a criminal 
case commences, the court argued that Giuffre “compels the conclusion that it is the 
use of coerced statements during a criminal trial, and not in obtaining an 
indictment, that violates the Constitution.”113  
2. Fourth Circuit 
In Burrell v. Virginia, The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of 
whether the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination only applied at 
trial.114  Charles Burrell was involved in an auto accident on February 19, 2002.115  
After the accident, Officer Chris Johnson requested that Burrell produce proof of 
insurance for his vehicle.116  Instead of producing his proof of insurance, Burrell 
refused to answer Officer Johnson and expressed his Fifth Amendment right 
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against self-incrimination.117  In response, the officer warned Burrell that if he 
continued to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege, Burrell would be arrested for 
obstruction of justice.118  Sergeant John Hall, Officer Johnson’s supervisor, arrived 
on the scene and repeated the warning but to no avail.119 
During Burrell’s transport to the hospital for treatment of injuries he sustained 
during the accident, Officer Johnson served him with a Confirmation of Liability 
form.120  The form required that Burrell provide liability insurance information to 
the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles within thirty days.121  Officer Johnson 
also served Burrell with two summonses: one for lack of insurance and another for 
obstruction of justice.122  Burrell was convicted of obstruction of justice, but the 
failure to pay the uninsured motorist fee was dismissed.123  A Virginia appellate 
court later dismissed the obstruction conviction.124 
Burrell filed a §1983 suit in federal court, alleging that the defendants violated 
his Fifth Amendment rights by compelling him to produce evidence of insurance 
and by issuing a citation without probable cause.125  In his complaint, Burrell also 
claimed criminal violations of the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause, as 
well as a civil allegation for liability under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act.126  The District Court dismissed all of those claims for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.127  Burrell appealed the dismissals.128 
The Court of Appeals found that Chavez barred a §1983 suit under the 
circumstances of Burrell’s case, regardless of whether the Fifth Amendment 
precluded the admission of insurance information produced under compulsion.129  
This was so because Chavez refused to allow a §1983 suit to proceed since no 
compelled testimony was ever admitted in court and, therefore, there was no 
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constitutional violation.130  The Court of Appeals found that Burrell did not allege 
any trial action that violated his Fifth Amendment rights, and thus failed to state a 
claim.131 
3. Fifth Circuit 
In the 1996 case of Murray v. Earle, LaCresha Murray was eleven years old when 
she was involved in the death of two-year-old Jayla Belton.132  At that time, LaCresha 
lived with her grandparents (who were also her adoptive parents), R.L. and Shirley 
Murray.133  The Murrays provided daycare in their home for Jayla Belton, as well as 
for several other children.134  
In May of 1996, Belton was dropped off at the Murray home for daycare.135  As 
the day progressed, Belton began to show signs of illness.136  After realizing that 
Belton had vomited at the lunch table, LaCresha’s older sister, Shawntay, gave 
Belton some medicine and put her to bed.137  No one looked in on Belton until late 
that afternoon.138  At trial, R.L. Murray testified that at some point during the 
afternoon, he noticed that LeCresha had gone to the back of the house, near the 
bedroom where Belton was sleeping.139  He claimed that he heard “thumping noises” 
but, assuming that LaCresha was just playing with a ball, he told her to stop.140  Soon 
after, LaCresha told R.L. that Belton was “throwing up and shaking.”141  Around 5:00 
p.m., a parent showed up to retrieve her children and noticed Belton’s condition.142  
The parent urged R.L. to call 911; however, he declined.143  Instead, R.L. took Belton 
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to the hospital himself.144  Belton was pronounced dead at approximately 5:30 p.m.145 
An autopsy revealed horrifying injuries.  There were over thirty bruises to 
Belton’s head, ear, forehead, back, shoulder, elbow, chest, and the left side of her 
torso.146  Even worse, Belton received a blow to the abdomen that broke four of her 
ribs and split her liver into two pieces.147  The medical examiner determined that 
Belton died within five to fifteen minutes of her injuries and ruled her death a 
homicide.148 
It is unclear when LaCresha first became a suspect, but three days after the 
autopsy, Detective Hector Reveles directed Detectives Ernest Pedraza and Albert 
Eells, as well as Angela McGown of Travis County Child Protective Services, to 
interview LaCresha.149  After Detectives Reveles and Pedraza conferred with an 
assistant district attorney, they determined that LaCresha was not in the custody of 
the state, and that the interview did not need to occur in front of a magistrate.150  
LaCresha was given a Miranda warning, but her parents were not notified of the 
interview nor was an attorney.151 
After about two hours of questioning, LaCresha confessed that she had dropped 
Belton and kicked her.152  LaCresha was subsequently charged with capital murder 
and injury to a child, then convicted of negligent homicide and injury to a child after 
her statement was admitted by the juvenile court.153  After widespread publicity, a 
new trial was ordered.154  During that proceeding, in which LaCresha was charged 
with injury to a child, her statement of confession was again admitted, and 
LaCresha was again convicted.155  As a result, LaCresha was adjudicated as a 
delinquent and sentenced to twenty-five years in the custody of the Texas Youth 
Commission.156  Three years later, a Texas appellate court reversed LaCresha’s 
 
144  Id. 
145  Id. 
146  Id. 
147  Id. 
148  Id. 
149  Id. 
150  Id.  
151  Id. at 283–84. 
152  Id. at 284. 
153  Id. 
154  Id. 
155  Id. 
156  Id. 
T H E  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  N E W  H A M P S H I R E  L A W  R E V I E W  1 8 : 1  ( 2 0 1 9 )  
126 
conviction, finding that her confession was inadmissible.157  LaCresha subsequently 
brought a §1983 suit in the District Court for the Western District of Texas, which 
dismissed all of her claims, except her Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and her state law civil conspiracy claims.158  The defendants appealed 
the denial of their summary judgment motions on those counts.159 
Early in its opinion, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that “[t]he 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is a fundamental trial right 
which can be violated only at trial, even though pre-trial conduct by law 
enforcement officials may ultimately impair that right.”160  The Court of Appeals 
offered no analysis of this statement or support for the tenant of law other than a 
footnote citation to Chavez and another case.161  The Court of Appeals ultimately 
determined that summary judgment in favor of the defendants was appropriate.162 
B. Extending Beyond Trial 
1. Second Circuit 
Abdallah Higazy’s story began on September 11, 2001.163  Higazy was an 
Egyptian student, studying computer engineering at Polytechnic University in 
Brooklyn, New York with sponsorship from the United States Agency for 
International Development and the Institute for International Education.164  His 
sponsors arranged for him to stay at the Millenium Hotel, which was located across 
the street from the World Trade Center.165 
Higazy awoke about forty-five minutes before the first hijacked plane crashed 
into the World Trade Center.166  Shortly after the second plane crashed, Higazy and 
the other hotel guests were evacuated from the hotel, leaving Higazy with only one 
hundred dollars in cash, his wallet, and the clothes he was wearing.167  In late 
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September or early October, hotel employees, including Millenium’s chief security 
officer, Stuart Yule, and another security employee, Ronald Ferry, began retrieving 
and inventorying guest property that remained after the evacuation.168  Ferry 
informed Yule that he found a radio, a passport, a yellow medallion, and a Koran in 
room 5101.169  In November, a different hotel employee brought the radio to Yule’s 
attention; this time, Yule called the FBI to tell them that he had “something of 
interest they should see.”170  Agents Vincent Sullivan and Christopher Bruno 
examined the radio and determined that it was “an air-band transceiver capable of 
air-to-air and air-to-ground communication.”171 
On December 17, 2001, Higazy went to the Millenium to retrieve his 
belongings.172  He arrived in the morning because he had an exam scheduled for that 
afternoon.173  While at the hotel, Higazy was approached by Agents Sullivan and 
Bruno, as well as a third FBI agent, Adam Suits.174  The agents asked Higazy about 
the radio and Higazy denied the radio was his.175  Even after being told that the radio 
was found in his room’s safe, Higazy continued to express his denial, replying: 
“[T]hat’s impossible.”176  During this conversation, Higazy told the agents that he 
had never seen such a radio before; however, he later told the agents that “he was 
once a lieutenant in the Egyptian Air Force and had knowledge of radio 
communications.”177  At the end of the interview, Higazy was detained as a material 
witness and taken to the FBI building.178 
Higazy voluntarily waived his right to counsel but then changed his mind and 
asked for an attorney.179  At that point the interrogation stopped and Higazy spent 
the night of December 17, 2011 in detention.180  In light of contradictions between 
Higazy’s statements and those of Millenium Hotel employees, Agent Bruno swore 
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out an affidavit concluding that “Higazy might have given false statements to 
federal law enforcement agents.”181  The affidavit was dated December 18, 2001.182  
Higazy was taken later that day before the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York on a material witness warrant.183  Counsel for Higazy 
told the court that his client denied owning the radio and was “urgently desirous of 
taking a lie detector test.”184 
Over the doubts of the government, Higazy was administered a polygraph test 
by Agent Templeton on December 27, 2001.185  The first round of questions 
“[allegedly] suggested that Higazy’s answers to questions related to the September 
11 attacks were deceptive.”186  During the second round of questions, Higazy 
reported intense pain in his arm and asked Templeton to stop.187  Templeton 
reportedly called Higazy a baby; when asked if other people ever suffered physical 
pain during a polygraph, Templeton responded that “[i]t never happened to anyone 
who told the truth.”188 
During the polygraph, Higazy gave a series of explanations regarding how he 
had obtained the radio.189  His first explanation was that he stole the radio from an 
electronics store.190  Higazy then stated that he found it near the electronics store.191  
Next, he claimed he never saw nor possessed the radio.192  Later on in the test, 
Higazy admitted finding the radio on the other side of the Brooklyn Bridge.193  
Finally, he admitted stealing the radio from the Egyptian military.194  Throughout 
the course of this interrogation, Templeton yelled at Higazy for lying and said he 
would “tell Agent Sullivan in my expert opinion you are a terrorist.”195  Templeton 
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wrote a statement saying that Higazy stole the radio from the Egyptian military, but 
Higazy’s attorney advised him not to sign it.196  Subsequently, on January 11, 2002, 
Agent Bruno charged Higazy with making false statements.197  The magistrate judge 
ordered Higazy held without bail.198 
Three days later, an airline pilot who had been a guest on the 50th floor of the 
Millenium Hotel, one floor below where Higazy stayed, returned to the property to 
reclaim his belongings.199  After looking through his items, the pilot informed hotel 
staff that his transceiver was missing.200  When contacted by the hotel, the FBI 
verified that the transceiver believed to be Higazy’s actually belonged to the pilot.201  
Ferry was re-interviewed by the FBI and changed his account to say that the radio 
was found on a table in Higazy’s room and not in a safe.202  As a result, the 
government withdrew the complaint against Higazy.203  Higazy subsequently filed 
an eight-count complaint against Templeton and the hotel, which included a claim 
that Higazy’s Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination were violated.204 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals based its decision in this case on a 
different reading of Chavez than the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits.205  The court 
cited Justice Thomas’s conclusion that “a ‘criminal case’ at the very least requires the 
initiation of legal proceedings.”206  Building on this, as well as citing to additional 
cases, the Court of Appeals determined that bail hearings constitute part of the 
criminal proceeding.207 
After concluding that a bail hearing was part of the criminal case against 
Higazy, the Court of Appeals addressed whether the use of Higazy’s statements 
violated the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on coerced statements.208  Relying on 
prior Second Circuit precedent, the Court of Appeals found that “the use or the 
 
196  Id. 
197  Id. at 167. 
198  Id. 
199  Id.  
200  Id.  
201  Id. 
202  Id. 
203  Id. 
204  Id. at 168. 
205  Id. at 171. 
206  Id. (citing Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766 (2003)). 
207  Higazy, 505 F.3d at 172–73. 
208  Id. at 173–74. 
T H E  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  N E W  H A M P S H I R E  L A W  R E V I E W  1 8 : 1  ( 2 0 1 9 )  
130 
derivative use of a compelled statement at any criminal proceeding against the 
declarant violates the person’s Fifth Amendment rights; use of the statement at trial 
is not required.”209  The court further argued that there is no indication in Chavez 
that the use of an allegedly coerced statement at an initial appearance cannot be 
used in a criminal case.210  Ultimately, the court found that the use of Higazy’s 
statements at the bail hearing did violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.211 
2. Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has visited this issue on two separate 
occasions, first, in Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, Illinois,212 and again in Best v. City of 
Portland.213  In each case the Court of Appeals determined that a “criminal case” 
extended beyond just a trial.214  These cases are discussed in detail below.  
a. Sornberger 
On January 12, 2001, First Bank in Knoxville, Illinois was robbed by a man 
wearing a baseball cap.215  Only the teller caught a glimpse of the robber’s face, and 
she gave the police a general, physical description.216  Later, when several of the 
bank’s employees were reviewing footage of the robbery, one of the employees 
remarked that the robber “looked like” Scott Sornberger.217  The other employees 
agreed, and Knoxville Chief of Police Rick Pesci heard at least one of the employees 
comment about the resemblance to Sornberger.218 
Based on this information, Chief Pesci questioned several bank employees and 
learned that Sornberger and his wife were previous customers at First Bank but that 
their account was closed because of a low account balance.219  Police were sent to 
Sornberger’s place of employment to bring him to the police station.220  Although 
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police found that Sornberger did not meet the physical description given by the 
teller, they questioned Sornberger and learned that he experienced recent financial 
difficulties.221 
That same evening, Knoxville police questioned Sornberger’s wife, Teresa, at 
the police station.222  Despite being separated during questioning, the Sornbergers 
offered consistent alibis.223  Both stated that they were at Sornberger’s parents’ 
home using his parents’ computer at the time of the incident.224 
Chief Pesci brought in several police officers from Galesburg to assist in the 
investigation, and on the day following the robbery, one of the officers, Officer 
Clauge, brought photographs from the surveillance cameras as well as pictures of 
Sornberger to show to the State’s Attorney.225  The State’s Attorney declined to seek 
an arrest warrant for Sornberger, but did obtain a search warrant for the computer 
to confirm Sornberger’s alibi.226  After a further meeting with Chief Pesci and 
Officer Clauge, the State’s Attorney determined that there was probable cause to 
arrest Sornberger for armed robbery.227  The officers agreed to arrest Sornberger 
“during the execution of the search warrant . . . and . . . re-interview Teresa if she 
could be found at [Scott Sornberger’s] parents’ home.”228 
The day after the robbery the officers arrived at Sornberger’s parents’ house; 
only Teresa was home.229  She accompanied officers to the Galesburg police station 
(it is disputed whether this was done voluntarily or under duress) but was allowed 
to ride in the front seat and was not restrained.230  Officers Sheppard and Riley 
interviewed Teresa, resulting in a verbal, and later a written, confession in which 
she admitted that she assisted Sornberger in robbing First Bank.231 
Upon arriving in Galesburg, Teresa was informed that she was a suspect in the 
robbery.232   
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Teresa claim[ed] that she was then . . . coerced into confessing by Officer Sheppard who 
allegedly (1) falsely told her that witnesses placed her at the scene of the robbery; (2) 
“repeatedly told her to think about her kids”; (3) “yelled at her and accused her of lying”; 
(4) falsely promised her that, if she implicated her husband, she would not be charged 
with any crime; (5) “threatened to call the Department of Children and Family 
Services” . . . to take her children away if she maintained her innocence; and (6) “refused 
to honor her request to speak to an attorney.”233   
Finally, she claimed that she never received a Miranda warning “until asked to repeat 
her oral confession to the Galesburg police stenographer.”234 
The defendants claimed that Teresa needed little prodding before she 
voluntarily confessed.235  The officers said that they informed her that they believed 
Sornberger robbed the bank, asked Teresa about a witness who saw her leave the 
bank that same day, and encouraged her to think about her children instead of 
protecting Sornberger.236  The defendants further maintained that Officer 
Sheppard advised Teresa of her Miranda rights.237  
After Teresa confessed, Chief Pesci was brought into the room and Teresa was 
asked to repeat her confession.238  She refused, and this time the officers admitted 
that they made threats.239  Eventually, Teresa was presented with a transcribed 
version of her confession and signed it.240 
Criminal proceedings were brought against Sornberger and Teresa, with 
Teresa’s statement offered into evidence in support of the charges.241  A pre-trial 
motion to suppress the confession was denied, with the court finding no violation 
of the right against self-incrimination.242  While the Sornbergers were in custody 
awaiting trial, a man named Phillip Pitcher (who resembled Sornberger) committed 
a number of bank robberies in Indiana and Illinois.243  Further investigation by the 
FBI resulted in the charges against Sornberger and Teresa being dropped.244  
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Sornberger and Teresa filed a §1983 suit against the City of Knoxville and the 
involved officers, alleging in part that Teresa’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination was violated.245 
The Seventh Circuit engaged in a lengthy examination of Chavez before 
addressing the two cases it considered to be the most similar: Renda and Burrell.246  
The court noted that Renda left open the question of “when a statement is used in a 
criminal proceeding.”247  Next, the court noted that unlike in Burrell, Teresa’s 
statements were used against her to support a determination of probable cause, to 
set proper bail, and at arraignment.248  Therefore, the three “courtroom uses” of 
Teresa’s unwarned statements did violate her Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.249 
b. Best 
In 2009, the Seventh Circuit revisited the issue of what constitutes a criminal 
case in Best v. City of Portland.250  In this case, Larry Best was charged in an Indiana 
state court with two drug crimes: possession of methamphetamine and possession 
with intent to distribute methamphetamine.251  The evidence against Best was 
obtained through searches of two homes: one with a warrant and one with the 
owner’s consent.252  Best unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence on the 
grounds that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated.253  In an interlocutory 
appeal, the trial court’s ruling was affirmed.254  Best then deposed the officer who 
led the searches and, based on new information obtained in the deposition, filed a 
motion to reconsider the original motion to suppress.255  The prosecutor, however, 
dropped the charges against Best before the trial court could issue a ruling.256 
Before the charges were dropped, Best filed a §1983 suit naming the City of 
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Portland and four police officers as defendants.257  Among the claims included in 
the complaint was a claim that Best’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination had been violated.258  The District Court for the Northern District of 
Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding in part that 
“Best’s right against self-incrimination could not have been violated because the 
case was dismissed before it went to trial.”259 
In addressing whether Best’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination were violated, the Court of Appeals relied on its prior ruling in 
Sornberg.260  Specifically, the court found that the use of Best’s allegations that his 
statements had been used at a suppression hearing were sufficient to allow a §1983 
case to proceed because the suppression hearing was part of a criminal case.261  The 
court remanded the case without reaching the merits of Best’s claim.262 
3. Ninth Circuit 
In Stoot v. City of Everett, Paul Stoot II was accused of sexually assaulting a four 
year old girl.263  On January 15, 2003, the investigating officer, Detective Jon Jensen, 
called the middle school where Stoot was a student to arrange an on-campus 
interview in the principal’s office.264 Before conducting the interview, Jensen met 
with two prosecutors in order to review the legal standards for interviewing a 
juvenile.265  Based on these discussions, Jensen noted that he learned two pieces of 
information: “(1) if the juvenile requests his parents during the interview, treat the 
request the same as one for legal counsel, and (2) give the juvenile a Miranda 
warning and have him sign the waiver form” even if the interview is non-
custodial.266  After this meeting, Jensen informed the middle school principal that 
she did not need to contact Stoot’s parents; rather, he would do so after the 
interview.267 
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Jensen testified that during the interview, he explained Stoot’s rights, Stoot 
understood those rights, and Stoot waived those rights.268  In his testimony, Jensen 
claimed that he employed “the interviewing technique of blaming the victim.”269  
Ultimately, Stoot confessed to touching the victim.270 
Stoot and his parents contended that after Stoot repeatedly denied touching the 
victim, Jensen changed his tactics and began making impermissible threats.271  After 
two hours of questioning, Stoot claimed he made a false confession.272  Additionally, 
Stoot and his parents alleged that Jensen’s interviewing tactics violated Miranda 
because Stoot lacked capacity to consent to the interrogation.273 
After the interview, a prosecutor filed an Information charging Stoot with first 
degree child molestation.274  The Affidavit of Probable Cause attached to the 
Information relied only on the statements of the complaining witness, the interview 
with the victim, and Stoot’s confession.275  On November 3, 2004, a hearing was held 
to determine the admissibility of Stoot’s statement.276  After hearing from Jensen, 
Stoot, and experts, the court determined that Stoot lacked capacity to understand 
his rights, and the waiver of his rights was invalid.277  The court also determined that 
the statements made by Stoot were the result of “impermissible coercion.”278  
Finally, the court dismissed the charges against Stoot.279 
Stoot and his parents filed a §1983 suit against Jensen and the City of Everett.280  
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims, 
including finding that Stoot did not demonstrate a claim that his Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination was violated because the statements against him 
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were never used in a criminal trial.281  Stoot appealed to the Ninth Circuit.282 
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals argued that Stoot’s Fifth Amendment claim 
fell “squarely within the gray area created by Chavez.”283  Unlike the plaintiff in 
Chavez, who was never charged with a crime, Stoot’s statements were used against 
him in the Affidavit accompanying the Information which charged him with a 
crime, in a pretrial arraignment, and again in an evidentiary hearing.284  The Court 
of Appeals considered prior case law from other circuits before adopting the 
approach of Sornberger and Higazy.285  The court found that the use of coerced 
statements at trial was not required for Stoot to assert a claim that his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination had been violated.286 
4. Tenth Circuit 
Matthew Vogt was a police officer in the City of Hays, Kansas.287  In 2013, Mr. 
Vogt applied for employment with the Haysville Police Department.288  During the 
hiring process, Mr. Vogt revealed that he still maintained a knife that he obtained 
during the course of his employment as a police officer in Hays.289  Despite this 
revelation, the Haysville Police Department offered Mr. Vogt a position based on 
the condition that he report his acquisition of the knife and return it to the Hays 
Police Department.290 
Mr. Vogt complied with the condition and reported to the Hays Police 
Department that he had kept the knife.291  The Chief of the Hays Police Department 
ordered Vogt to submit a report concerning his possession of the knife and Vogt 
complied by submitting a one-sentence report.292 Vogt subsequently provided the 
Hays Police Department with his two-week notice.293 
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Concurrently, the Hays police chief initiated an internal investigation into 
Vogt’s possession of the knife.294  In order to keep his job with Hays Police, the 
department required that Vogt give a more detailed statement regarding the 
knife.295  Vogt complied, and the additional statement was used to find more 
evidence.296  The Hays police chief ultimately asked the Kansas Bureau of 
Investigation to open a criminal investigation, and in support of this request, 
turned over Mr. Vogt’s statements and the additional evidence.297  Because of the 
pending investigation, the Haysville Police Department withdrew its job offer to 
Vogt.298 
Vogt was charged in state court with two felony counts related to his possession 
of the knife.299  After a probable cause hearing, the state district court found that 
there was no probable cause and the charges against Vogt were dismissed.300  Vogt 
then filed suit in the District Court of Kansas alleging that his statements were used: 
“(1) to start an investigation leading to the discovery of additional evidence 
concerning the knife, (2) to initiate a criminal investigation, (3) to bring criminal 
charges, and (4) to support the prosecution during the probable cause hearing.”301  
The District Court dismissed Vogt’s complaint for failure to state a claim, holding 
that the right against self-incrimination is only a trial right and that Vogt’s 
statements were used in pretrial proceedings, not in a trial.302   
The Court of Appeals’ opinion turned on the meaning of “criminal case” under 
the Fifth Amendment.303  While the District Court found that the use of Vogt’s 
statements did not violate the Fifth Amendment because they were not used at trial, 
the Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that the phrase “criminal case” also includes 
probable cause hearings.304  The court’s stated basis for reaching this conclusion 
included reliance on the text of the Fifth Amendment and the Framers’ 
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understanding of the right against self-incrimination.305 
The court first addressed the text of the Fifth Amendment, drawing attention 
to the fact that the text does not include the term “trial” or “criminal prosecution.”306  
Far from being a lawyers’ quibble about semantics, the text of the Fifth Amendment 
is important for its differences from other Amendments.307  The Court of Appeals 
discussed the Supreme Court’s distinction between the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments in Counselman v. Hitchcock.308  In that case, the Supreme Court held 
that a witness could plead the Fifth Amendment during a grand jury proceeding 
because the Fifth Amendment’s “criminal case” language is broader than the Sixth 
Amendment’s “criminal prosecution.”309  The Court of Appeals agreed with the 
Counselman opinion, arguing that the term “criminal case” on its face encompasses 
all of the proceedings involved in a “criminal prosecution”310 
The Court of Appeals then moved on to analyze the meaning of “criminal case” 
at the time of ratification in 1791, by reviewing dictionary definitions from the 
Founding era.311  The Court of Appeals first addressed the 1828 dictionary published 
by Noah Webster.312  This dictionary defined “case” as “[a] cause or suit in court” and 
says that the term “is nearly synonymous” with the term “cause.”313  The same 
dictionary defines “cause” as a “suit or action in court.”314  Based on these 
definitions, the Court of Appeals determined that the Founder’s understanding of 
the term “case,” at least as it relates to the Fifth Amendment, included more than 
the trial itself.315 
Apart from the dictionary definitions, the Court of Appeals also supported its 
decision by considering the Framer’s understanding of the phrase “in any criminal 
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case.”316  First the court considered a draft of the Fifth Amendment by James 
Madison which omitted the phrase “criminal case” and read: 
No person shall be subject, to more than one punishment, or one trial for the same 
offense; nor shall be compelled to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law; nor be obliged to relinquish his property, where 
it may be necessary for public use, without just compensation.317 
The court found this draft meant that the protection against self-incrimination 
extended to civil as well as criminal cases.318 
Second, the court addressed an objection to Madison’s wording of the Fifth 
Amendment by Representative John Laurence, who was concerned that Madison’s 
wording would create a conflict with “laws passed.”319  While it was unclear what 
laws might be conflicted, Rep. Laurence proposed adding the phrase “in any 
criminal case.”320  The court also argued that at the time that Rep. Laurence’s 
addition was accepted there was agreement that “the right against self-
incrimination was not limited to a suspects own trial.”321  The reason for this was 
that, at the time of the ratification of the Fifth Amendment, criminal defendants 
were unable to testify in their own cases.322 
Finally, in determining that the right against self-incrimination applied to 
more than just trial, the Court of Appeals rejected an argument that this 
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment was not practical because pretrial hearings 
are frequently used to determine admissibility of evidence at trial.323  The basis for 
this argument is that “courts have held . . . that evidence may be used in pretrial 
hearings even if the evidence would be inadmissible at trial.”324  The Court of 
Appeals did not find this argument helpful because it assumes that the use of 
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compelled statements in pretrial hearings is not inadmissible under the Fifth 
Amendment.325  Since the court found that the Fifth Amendment did apply to 
pretrial hearings, it necessarily followed that compelled statements are 
inadmissible in pretrial proceedings.326 
C. Analysis 
From an evolutionary view, the right against self-incrimination is in a 
fascinating position.  The split between circuits highlights the attempt to maintain 
a traditional view of the right, consistent with its history and prior applications, 
while at the same time showing the beginnings of the law moving in a different 
direction.  This is doctrinal evolution in real time. 
Eventually, one of these strains of thought will prevail and be explicitly adopted 
by the United States Supreme Court.  There is reason to believe that the evolving 
view, which is to say the view that the right against self-incrimination extends to 
pre-trial proceedings as well as applying at trial, will eventually be adopted.  Since 
the ratification of the Constitution, a number of changes have occurred in criminal 
law, including the development of the modern police force, the development of rules 
of evidence, and most importantly, the formalization of criminal procedure.  The 
old view of the right against self-incrimination does not account for these changes. 
A proponent of maintaining the traditional view of the right against self-
incrimination might argue that the text of the Fifth Amendment should be 
interpreted through the meaning of the words at the time they were written.  This 
sort of Originalism, as Justice Scalia notes, “requires the consideration of an 
enormous mass of materials.”327  Nonetheless, in Vogt, the Tenth Circuit undertook 
just that sort of analysis.  The Vogt Court attempted to determine the meaning of 
“criminal case” by relying on dictionaries from the founding era.328  The court found 
that the term “case” meant “a cause or suit in court.”329  This Originalist approach, 
at least as applied by the Vogt court, is unconvincing for two reasons: first, the 
definition of “case” relied upon by the Court does not lead directly to the conclusion 
that the Framers intended the right against self-incrimination to extend beyond 
trial.  Second, there is a gap in this reasoning that would need to be filled by 
addressing criminal procedure at the time of ratification. 
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If we interpret the phrase “criminal case” to mean criminal cases as we 
experience them today, it is difficult to exclude pre-trial proceedings from 
protection.  There is precedent to support this view.  In Counselman v. United States, 
the Supreme Court held that a witness could invoke the Fifth Amendment during a 
grand jury proceeding because the Fifth Amendment’s “criminal case” language is 
more broad than the Sixth Amendment “criminal prosecution” language.330  
Counselman also seems to support the idea that the term “criminal case” should be 
interpreted by considering the plain meaning of the text in modern language.331 
A counter argument against extending the right against self-incrimination 
might point out that evidence which is not admissible at trial is often admitted at 
pre-trial proceedings.  This argument was rejected by the Vogt court on the grounds 
that it assumes the use of compelled statements at pre-trial proceedings is not 
prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.332  Additionally, the fact that some evidence 
which is inadmissible at trial may be considered in pretrial proceedings does little 
to address the fact that criminal procedure, and the scope of the “criminal case” has 
changed since the Fifth Amendment was ratified.  It is more reasonable to conclude 
that the law regarding the scope of criminal cases has evolved, and that the law 
regarding the scope of the right against self-incrimination should change with it. 
C ONC L US I ON 
By reviewing the history and application of the right against self-incrimination, 
it is evident that this right has evolved over time from its early origins in the English 
common law, through its enshrinement in the Fifth Amendment, and on to the 
present.  It is equally evident that this right is now at a point where it may either 
evolve to address the “criminal case” in its modern form or keep plugging along in 
its traditional form.  While allowing the right to continue to evolve best suits the 
needs of defendants in modern criminal cases, only time will tell whether the courts 
will continue to allow the right against self-incrimination to grow, or force it to 
remain a relic of late 18th Century criminal procedure. 
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